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Feast or Famine: Do Ethiopians Have a
Choice?
I. Background
[T]his is just the beginning of a resurgence of caring for others.
It says something about getting back to the basic human family.
It's a dream, a positive dream.'
This and other inspirational comments 2 were voiced on July 13,
1985, the day the Live Aid Concert united the world to raise money
to feed the starving people in Africa. With 90,0003 people jammed
into Philadelphia's John F. Kennedy stadium, 72,0004 in London's
Wembly Stadium and uncounted others at smaller concerts through-
out the world,6 Live Aid may be the largest humanitarian effort
ever.' The sixteen hour 7 worldwide rock concert raised sixty-five mil-
lion dollars,8 all of which was intended to aid African famine
victims.,
Live Aid was the brainchild of Bob Geldof, an Irish rock musi-
cian who coordinated the entire event. "To me [Live Aid] is simply a
means of keeping people alive," Geldof said.10 He pledged that the
bulk of the Live Aid proceeds would be used in the Sudan and Ethi-
opia where the famine has hit the hardest."
I. Remarks on the "Live Aid" concert by Mary Travers, former member of the folk
group, Peter, Paul and Mary. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1985, at C18, col. 1.
2. Folk singer Joan Baez welcomed the Philadelphia crowd by saying, "Good morning,
children of the 80's. This is your Woodstock and it's long overdue." Id. Singer and guitarist
Neil Young also recalled the 1969 Woodstock concert in Bethal, New York, but noted the
difference between that concert and Live Aid. "Last time we all got together to see what
would happen. This time it's for somebody. This time you know it's going to help." N.Y.
Times, July 14, 1985, at A14, col. 2. A seventeen year old from New Jersey observed, "The
spirit is just bouncing off people." Id.
3. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1985, at A14, col. 2.
4. Id.
5. Concerts were held in the Netherlands, Japan, West Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia,
the Soviet Union, and Australia. Additionally, 152 countries watched this massive event by
satellite. Id.
6. Id. An estimated 1.9 billion people watched Live Aid on television or listened to it on
the radio. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1985, at C18, col. 1.
7. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1985, at C18, col. 1.
8. Trimble, Rain and Aid Save Millions of Africans - For Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 20, 1986, at 32.
9. Organizer Bob Geldof told the London audience that 100% of the money pledged
would go directly to buying food, medical supplies, and farming equipment. N.Y. Times, July
15, 1985, at C18, col. I.
10. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1985, at A14, col. 2.
II. Additionally, Geldof stated that Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso would each receive a
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Ethiopia paints the bleakest picture of the African famine. In
October 1984, the world became aware of the African famine
through a BBC television film depicting the camps in Wollo, an
Ethiopian province. In that year alone, as a result of population ex-
pansion, civil wars, drought, desertification, and the priority of cash
cropping for export over peasant farming,1 2 Ethiopia was in need of
tons13 of food to feed its two million starving people.1 ' In 1985 Ethi-
opia required 1.5 million tons of food aid 5 and has asked for 1.6
million tons to meet its needs in 1986.16 Ethiopia's leader, Lieuten-
ant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam has accused the West of failing
to provide adequate long-term aid.' 7 He has also asserted that West-
ern donors have not provided enough trucks and spare parts.' 8
Some commentators deny that human rights are part of interna-
tional law. The general consensus, however, is that some basic
human rights are protected by an international minimum standard.
Although the right to food is given much attention in international
forums, it generally is not a right that states are required to guaran-
tee their citizens. Nevertheless, the right to life and the right to be
free from torture are universally recognized human rights. 9 There-
fore, recent acts by the Ethiopian government that deprive its people
of food may give breadth to these two more basic rights.
This Comment will discuss whether an international human
right to food can exist and, if so, whether Ethiopians have a right to
be fed by their government given the circumstances of the current
famine. An overview of Ethiopia's political and social environment
will be followed by an examination of international human rights law
as it is reflected in treaties, international agreements, and the cus-
toms and practices of states.
A. The World Comes to Ethiopia's Rescue
In October of 1984, the United States Government made a de-
million dollars and Niger may receive a million and a half. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at A15,
col. 4.
12. Shepherd, The Denial of the Right to Food: Development and Intervention in Af-
rica, 15 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 528 (1985). Shepherd notes that the socialist concept of the state
farm has been as disasterous in achieving development in Africa as the capitalist concept of
cash cropping for export. Generally, he believes that East-West tugs of war with African econ-
omies must cease for Africa to become self-reliant. Id. at 535-36.
13. G. HANCOCK. ETHIOPIA: THE CHALLENGE OF HUNGER (1985); The Hungriest
Twelve, SOUTH, Dec. 1984, at 52; Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 27, 1984, at 1, ol. 3.
14. Make Ethiopia Stop Shooting, So That Food Can Get Through to the Starving,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 1984, at 10 [hereinafter Make Ethiopia Stop Shooting].
15. London Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at 10, col. 2.
16. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at A27, col. I.
17. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1985, at A9, col. 4.
18. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at A8, col. I.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 146-56.
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cision to increase dramatically emergency food aid to Ethiopia.20
Over a period of two months, food deliveries jumped from 45,000 to
332,000 metric tons.2 ' One year later, United States assistance in-
cluded trucks, planes, medical supplies, tents, and other disaster aid
plus 550,000 metric tons of food.22 Government assistance, combined
with the aid raised by countless private groups, 2 3 makes the United
States Ethiopia's largest food supplier. 4 Moreover, groups such as
the Red Cross and other charitable organizations have been provid-
ing aid workers to distribute food, administer medical treatment, and
teach new farming methods to the Ethiopian people. 5 Additionally,
other countries have contributed what they could to feed Ethiopia's
starving population.2 6
B. The Ethiopian Government's Response
The Marxist Ethiopian government, known as the Dergue, and
its leader, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, have been
using foreign aid as a strategic tool in Ethiopia's twenty-five year old
civil war.27 The war that engulfs Ethiopia actually is a series of
smaller wars with several of the country's ethnic groups. Eritrea, a
former Italian colony, was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 through
a United Nations resolution. 8 In 1962, when Emperor Haile Selas-
sie changed Eritrea's status from a territory to a region, he sparked
a civil war that continues to this day.29 In addition to this war, simi-
lar wars exist with the Tigrean People's Liberation Front and the
20. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at A27, col. 1.
2 1. Id.
22. Id.
23. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1985, at A46, col. I (seventy-five competitors in the New York
City Marathon raised money to feed the hungry); N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1985, at C20, col. 3
(plans for Hands Across America); Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 30, 1984, at 24, col. I
(list of various groups that raised money for famine relief). Many other groups have held
inventive fundraising events to feed the hungry.
24. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1985, at A13, col. 1. The United States supplies more than a
third of the food relief entering Ethiopia at a cost exceeding a quarter of a billion dollars. Id.
25. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1985, at A7, col. 2 (Doctors Without Borders, a French
aid agency, wanted to open a childrens' feeding center in Wollo, an Ethiopian province); N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1985, at A]3, at col. I. (Washington-financed technical training program for
Ethiopians); N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at A8, col. i.
26. Fenton, Ethiopia: Victors and Victims, N.Y. Rev. Books, Nov. 7, 1985, at 18,19
("Fashion for Famine," a London fashion show); N.Y. Times, Oct 14, 1985, at C20, col. 3
(French pop singers staged a ten hour concert in Paris to raise money for Ethiopia); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at A27, col. I (The Soviet Union has sent 10,000 metric tons of food to
Ethiopia).
27. Silence on Ethiopia?, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 30, col. 1. The Ethiopian govern-
ment is using "Western food as bait to lure hungry people to feeding sites from which they
could be captured and deported." Id.
28. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1985, at A3, col. 4.
29. Fenton, supra note 26, at A3, col. 4. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front wants
independence from the Marxist Ethiopian government. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1985, at A3, col.
4.
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rebels in Wollo.30
The famine has become so severe that at least one faction is
willing to work with the government to feed the hungry. According
to Semere Russom, an Eritrean rebel spokesman, the Eritrean group
is willing to enter into a cease-fire with the Ethiopian government in
order to aid the distribution of relief assistance to famine victims.31
The government has rebuffed these offers, resulting in a denial of
food to the provinces of Eritrea, Tigre, and Wollo, while food stock-
piles in less needy areas.3 2
Instead of promptly unloading food at the port, Lieutenant
Colonel Mengistu has given priority to unloading Soviet ships bear-
ing military equipment.33 Meanwhile ships carrying nonmilitary aid
wait in the harbor an average of nine days before unloading.34 Once
on the dock, the food may sit for weeks unshielded from the ele-
ments."s Other aid equipment is treated similarly. 6
In February of 1985, aid officials reported that almost half of
the donated trucks in the country were in disrepair because of mis-
management and misuse.37 This situation is representative of the
deeper problem caused by the Ethiopian government's blatant disre-
gard of its people: while people are starving to death in Eritrea, Ti-
gre, and Wollo, food is accumulating in store houses in the Ethiopian
capital of Addis Ababa.38 The Dergue attributes the problem to
transportation difficulties, yet "a joint Oxfam/Save the Children
Fund fleet went for two months without being given any grain to
move."
3 9
Approximately one year ago, the Ethiopian government em-
30. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1985, at A3, col. 4.
3 1. Id.
32. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at A27, col. I; N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1985, at A13, col.
I; London Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at 10, col. 2.
33. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at A27, col. I ("[W]hile the United States is donating
at most 600,000 metric tons of food, the Soviet Union which has sold Ethiopia $2.5 billion in
military aid has sent merely 10,000 metric tons."); London, Who Says We Are the World?,
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, at A27, col. I; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at A8, col. I; see Make
Ethiopia Stop Shooting, supra note 14, at 10.
34. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, at A27, col. I.
35. In July, 1985, a rainstorm destroyed 10,000 metric tons of food. Id.
36. Bob Geldof's organization, "Band Aid," sent a convoy of Land Rovers meant for
food distribution. The vehicles sat outside Ethiopian customs sheds for months. Id.
37. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at A8, col. I.
38. See supra note 29; N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1985, at A13, col. 1. "According to In-
terfam, only 10% of the two million famine victims in rebel-held areas of Eritrea are receiving
regular aid shipments."; N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at A 13, col. 1. Tesfa A. Seyoum, Execu-
tive Director of the Eritrean Relief Committee, said that "except for the feeding stations set
up by the Ethiopian Government 'for public relations purposes,' none of the food aid sent to
Ethopia reached the people in Eritrea and Tigre."; see also N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, at
A27, col. I.
39. Starving Wollo: An Empty Excuse, London Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at 10, col. 2
[hereinafter Starving Wollo]. In the first four months of 1985, the province of Wollo was
receiving less than 9,000 tons of its needed 35,000 tons of grain each month while the Ethio-
pian capital, Addis Ababa, was receiving 12,000 tons of food aid each month. Id.
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barked on a huge resettlement program. Although the government
claims it is relocating people to the south for the purpose of fighting
hunger,40 the manner in which Ethiopia is transporting its people
conveys a much different purpose. 41 Without any prior warning, peo-
ple are often rounded up at the relief stations, 42 where they are de-
tained for several days while awaiting transport by bus, truck, or
plane.43 Often, these already hungry and weakened people receive
nothing to eat or drink." In one case, there were only two water
pipes in May Dero, where 4,000 to 8,000 people were waiting for
transport.4 5 One pipe was reserved for the soldiers, and the other was
available to the peasants provided the soldiers did not need it to
wash their uniforms."' The resettlers who were not weakened by
hunger before they reached the collection camps fell sick in the
camps due to catastrophic sanitary conditions.47
Within a year of its initiation, the resettlement program claimed
the lives of some 100,000 peasants. 48 One editorial compares this
treatment to a "mass extermination on the order of the Khmer
Rouge killing fields and the deportation of Armenians in 1915, with
the added horror that it wouldn't have been possible without the aid
and silence of Western famine relief.' '49 The editorial notes that
while resettlement continues, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu's army is
launching major military offenses in the heart of the famine re-
gions.50 The army draws its logistical support from the relief stock-
piles while it burns the rebels' crops.51
The Ethiopian government does not respect either Western do-
nors or aid workers much more than its own people living in the
40. Today's Holocast, Wall St. J., Jan 27, 1986, at 24, col. I. The places in which
persons are relocated are infested with malaria, water parasites, and, at some relocation sites,
the deadly tsetse fly. Fenton, supra note 26, at 18. Although the Dergue had difficulty in
transporting the food to Korem, a town in Wollo, it had plans to move the 100,000 population
of Korem to Sekota, a town that is nine hours further along a bad road. Starving Wollo, supra
note 39, at 10, col. 2.
41. Today's Holocast, supra note 40, at 24, col. I. The relocation program is not di-
rected by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, but by the Office for the Nationality
Problem. It was planned as early as 1981 after Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu's "Red Star"
offensive failed in Eritrea and Tigre. Id.
42. Silence on Ethiopia?, supra note 27, at 30, col. I.





47. Id. Upon arrival of the resettlers at Bole airport in Addis Ababa, "men were already
waiting with stretchers to carry away the dead and squashed passengers." Id.
48. This figure represents 20% of the resettlement program's targets. Today's Holocast,
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rebel areas. 52 The following examples indicate the Ethiopian govern-
ment's cavalier attitude toward those who wish to aid Ethiopians lo-
cated in rebel areas: Ethiopia gave the United States neither thanks
nor recognition for its gift of 550,000 metric tons of foods aid;53 a
French doctors' group was denied permission to set up a childrens'
feeding center in Wollo;54 Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu rejected a
plan proposed by Kurt Janasson, United Nations Assistant Secretary
General for Relief Operations in Ethiopia, to lead unarmed convoys
under Red Cross flags into contested areas; 55 the Dergue informed
the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) that
there were far too many foreign aid workers, or expatriates as the
Dergue calls them, working in Addis Ababa with relief agencies; 56
and, all 450 expatriates' jobs were to be reviewed with the idea of
reducing them to one expert per agency. 7 Generally, the Ethiopian
government has assumed a defensive attitude toward Western do-
nors. 58 Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu believes foreign relief agencies
are trying to run Ethiopia and, consequently, has demanded that aid
be sent directly to the government rather than through private relief
groups. 59
In an attempt to escape resettlement and starvation, peasants
flee to the Sudan. In February of 1985, as many as 3,000 people per
day were reported crossing from Eritrea and Tigre into the Sudan."0
Although the Sudan is the second hungriest nation, the refugees ap-
parently believe their chances for survival are better in the Sudan
than in Ethiopia. The Sudan has also provided a means of entry into
Ethiopia. Due to resistance encountered with the Ethiopian govern-
ment, relief agencies have been trying to reach the people of Eritrea
and Tigre from the Sudan.6 These efforts have not always suc-
52. After being threatened by Ethiopian authorities, relief workers were reluctant to talk
in detail about the government's actions. Starving Wollo, supra note 39, at 10, col. 2.
53. The Ethiopian press has made poignant accusations against the West and the United
States. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1985, at 13, col. 1. One priest visiting a camp in Makale re-
ported that "all the boxes of American food had been carefully turned around so that the U.S.
markings didn't show." Relations Sour Between Ethiopia and Western Food Donors, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at AS, col. 1.
54. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1985, at A7, col. 2.
55. Relations Sour Between Ethiopia and Western Food Donors, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
1985, at A8, col. I [hereinafter Relations Sour].
56. Fenton, supra note 26, at 18.
57. Id.
58. After visiting Ethiopia and interviewing an Ethiopian official, Fenton concluded that
in addition to hating journalists, pop stars, and politicians, the government officials felt that
each dollar given was an insult and that the donors' true purpose was to destroy the Ethiopian
government. Id.
59. Relations Sour, supra note 55, at A8, col. 1.
60. Id. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated
that as many as 25,000 people have crossed from Eritrea into the Sudan. War Rivals Drought
in Africa's Hunger Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
61. Tesfa A. Seymoum, Executive Director of the Ethiopian Relief Committee said that
80% of the food aid reaching Eritrea was transferred in from the Sudan. Kurt Jansson, Direc-
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ceeded. There is one documented case in which Ethiopia confiscated
grain worth over one million dollars - grain that had been con-
signed to relief organizations affiliated with Ethiopian rebel groups
based in the Sudan.62
Although the West has done its part to feed the starving mil-
lions in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government could do more for its
people. One commentator summed up this frustrating situation as
follows:
It is, in general, when the funds reach Ethiopia that reasoning
stubs it toe. Suddenly there is a government blocking the way.
Suddenly there is a war. Suddenly, where once there was only
the pure impulse of sympathy, there are politics and frustration.
And suddenly there is a seven day walk to get the food from A
to B.6s
II. Internal or International Concern?
At the annual meeting of the United Nations Human Rights
Commission, the United States delegation planned to introduce a
resolution calling for United Nations action on the Ethiopian reset-
tlement program.64 The United States government also drafted a res-
olution for the Commission requesting a special rapporteur to inves-
tigate the resettlement program.15 Although United States diplomats
and State Department decision makers are aware of the horrifying
reports concerning the program, some officials do not want to push
the resolutions.66 These United States officials reportedly want to use
Ethiopia as a bargaining chip to induce African cooperation on
projects favored by the United States. 7 The officials possibly are
concerned about alerting contributors to the fact that their money is
being used to perpetuate a war rather than to feed starving people.68
Alternatively, the officials may believe the Ethiopian situation is an
internal matter in which other governments should not interfere. 9
Because the United States' official position is that a nation's human
rights policies are an international concern,7 0 the latter explanation
tor of the United Nations relief operations in Ethiopia, denied this figure and said that less
than 10% of the aid was coming in from the Sudan. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1985, at A13, col. i.
62. Relations Sour, supra note 55, at A8, col. I.
63. Fenton, supra note 26, at 18.




68. In 1979, Westerners responded generously to the appeals for food for Kampuchea.
When they learned that the food was going badly astray, they grew cynical and the relief
effort was fatally damaged. Make Ethiopia Stop Shooting, supra note 14, at 10.
69. See infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
70. This is conveyed in 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2)(1982), which provides that "[nio secur-
ity assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent
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is most unlikely.
A. Human Rights are a Valid Part of International Law
1. United Nations Charter. - An examination of whether
human rights are an international concern should begin with an ex-
amination of the United Nations Charter. The Charter's drafters
were concerned about human rights, and this concern is reflected in
at least three of its Articles. The first mention of human rights ap-
pears in Article 1, which establishes the following goals for the
United Nations: "To achieve international co-operation in solving in-
ternational problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanita-
rian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion . . . ."" The drafters reiterated the
importance of human rights to the United Nations' goals later in the
Charter and stated that "[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions
or stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion. ' 72 Additionally, the Charter imposes
an affirmative obligation on member states to take both joint and
separate action to ensure the observance of these human rights and
fundamental freedoms. 73
The United Nations Charter is an important multilateral docu-
ment in international law. The Charter marks the beginning of mod-
ern international organization and continues to shape international
relations. Essentially, the Charter is recognized as the equivalent of
a constitution in a domestic legal system. 74 Moreover, the Charter's
express provisions concerning human rights are for some scholars
persuasive authority as to the binding effect of these provisions.75
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." The Act defines "gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights" as including "torture or cruel, inhu-
mane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charge and trial,
and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty or the security of a person." Id.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
72. Id. art. 55, para. c.
73. "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N.
CHARTER art. 56.
74. As a result of studying the practice of nations for thirty-five years, Sohn concluded
that the impact of the "Charter law" was equivalent to domestic constitutional law. Sohn, The
International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms, 9 HOESTRA L. REV. 347,
355 (1981).
75. Burgenthal, Codification and Implementation of Human Rights, in HUMAN DIG-
NITY - THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (L. Henkin ed. 1978); H. LAU-
TERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 145-52 (1950).
[Vol. 5:1
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2. Other Human Rights Covenants and Treaties. - The
Charter forms the foundation for a plethora of international and re-
gional instruments that identify and guarantee specific human rights.
The earliest and most highly regarded of these other instruments is
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.78 The Declaration out-
lines specific rights due to all persons including the right to life and
liberty;77 the right not to be enslaved;78 the right not to be tortured
or subject to degrading treatment;79 the right not to be arbitrarily
arrested or detained; 80 and the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion.8'
The Universal Delcaration of Human Rights articulates the
right to an adequate standard of living, including food. 82 The enor-
mous weight attributed to the Declaration is evidenced by a state-
ment in the Teheran Proclamation, which provides that the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights is viewed as "the common
understanding of the peoples of the world." a8 3 Additionally, leaders of
both the United States and the USSR adhere to a view expressed in
the Helsinki Accords that requires states to "act in conformity with
the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." '84
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the Declaration compose the international "Bill of Rights."85 In
evaluating the significance of the International Covenant on Civil
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948).
77. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 76, art. 3.
78. Id. art. 4.
79. Id. art. 5.
80. Id. art. 9.
81. Id. art. 18.
82. "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing . I..." Id. art. 25, para. I;
see also infra notes 206-212 and accompanying text.
83. Teheran Proclamation, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41, U.N. Pub. E.68.XIV.2 (1968).
The Teheran Proclamation was adopted at the International Conference on Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 2442, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 49-50, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (1968).
84. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act (Helsinki Accords)
Aug. I, 1975, Dept. St. Pub. No. 8826, Gen. Foreign Pol'y Series No. 298 (1975), reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 1295 [hereinafter Helsinki Accords].
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Civil and Political Cove-
nant]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Economic, Social
and Cultural Covenant]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 76; see also
Lippman, Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human Rights Under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 450, 471 (1980). The United
Nations General Assembly decided that the international "Bill of Rights" should consist of a
declaration and two covenants - one encompassing civil and political rights and the other
encompassing economic and social rights. See Report of the Commission on Human Rights,
Second Session, Economic and Social Council Office Records Supplement No. 1 (E1600),
para. 18, December 2 to 17, 1947; G.A. Resolutions 217F (111), December 10, 1948; 421E
(V), December 4, 1950; 543 (VI), February 5, 1952.
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and Political Rights, one commentator noted as follows: "For the
first time, the international community reached an agreement not
only on the list of basic human rights, but also on the content of
each right and on the most important limitations to such rights...
"86 The rights recognized in this Covenant include the right to life; 87
the right to be free from torture and enslavement; 88 the right to lib-
erty and security of the person, including protection from arbitrary
arrest or detention; 89 and the right to humane treatment of persons
in prison. 90 The Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant encom-
passes the right of all persons to freely determine their political sta-
tus and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural develop-
ment;91 the right to work; 92 the right to safe and healthy working
conditions;93 the right to the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health;9 4 and the right to education. 95 The Economic,
Social and Cultural Covenant specifically articulates the right to ad-
equate food:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to
the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States
Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of
this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of
international cooperation based on free consent.98
Since the delivery of many of these rights depends upon the state's
economic position, the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant di-
rects each State Party "to take steps individually and through inter-
national assistance and cooperation ... to the maximum of its avail-
able resources with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant. ' 97 The
Human Rights Committee is the organ responsible for implementing
the Civil and Political Covenant, while the Economic and Social
Council is the organ responsible for implementing the Economic, So-
86. See L.B. SOHN & T. BURGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 135 (1973).
87. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 6.
88. Id. arts. 7, 8.
89. Id. art. 9.
90. Id. art. 10.
91. Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 85, art. 1.
92. Id. art. 6.
93. Id. art. 7.
94. Id. art. 12.
95. Id. art. 13.
96. Id. art. II.
97. Id. art. 2, para. 1; see generally Lippman, supra note 85, at 477-79; see also
Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966
in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103, 108.
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cial and Cultural Covenant. 98
Regional instruments addressing human rights include the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,"e
the American Convention on Human Rights,100 and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.101 The European and Amer-
ican Conventions are similar in both their language and the rights
each guarantees. Both instruments provide for the right to life;1
0 2
prohibitions against torture, cruel, inhumane treatment, and slav-
ery;"'3 the right of an individual to have his cause heard;04 the right
to defense; 0 5 the presumption of innocence until proven guilty; 0 6
and the right to detailed notification of charges against the ac-
cused.107 These Conventions have a legally binding effect on the Par-
ties. 10 8 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has ad-
98. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 28. Members of the Human Rights
Committee are elected by the Parties to the Covenant. The Committee studies reports submit-
ted by the Parties and transmits its comments to the Parties concerned, studies and helps
resolve interstate communications alleging that a Party is not implementing the Covenant (the
Parties involved must first recognize the Committee's competence to receive interstate commu-
nications), appoints with the consent of the Parties concerned ad hoc conciliation commissions
to amicably solve problems, receives communications from individuals claiming to be victims
of Covenant violations (Parties must ratify the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights thereby authorizing the Committee to consider communications from individu-
als), and reports to the Economic and Social Council on its annual activities. Lippman, supra
note 85, at 482-505; see also Shelton, International Enforcement of Human Rights Effective-
ness and Alternatives, 1980 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 6, 9-1 I. The Economic and Social
Council requires Parties to submit biennial reports for various parts of the Covenant. Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 85, arts. 16-22; see also Shelton, supra, at 9.
99. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 1953 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71 (Cmd. 8969) [hereinafter
European Convention].
100. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.T.S. (No. 36) at i,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.K/XVl/I.l, Doc. 65, Rev.I, Corr. I (Jan. 7, 1970) reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 101 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention].
101. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter).
102. European Convention, supra note 99, art. 2; American Convention, supra note 100,
art. 6.
103. European Convention, supra note 99, art. 3; American Convention, supra note 100,
art. 5, para. 2.
104. European Convention, supra note 99, art. 6; American Convention, supra note 100,
art. 8.
105. European Convention, supra note 99, art. 6, para. 3(c); American Convention,
supra note 100, art. 8, para. 2(e).
106. European Convention, supra note 99, art. 6, para. 3(a); American Convention,
supra note 100, art. 8, para. 2(b).
107. European Convention, supra note 99, art. 6, para. e(a); American Convention,
supra note 100, art. 8, para. 2(b). The right not to incriminate oneself and the right to confess
only absent coercion are unique to the American Convention. See American Convention, supra
note 100, art. 8, paras. 2(g), 3.
108. The European Convention reads as follows: "The High Contracting Parties shall
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this
Convention." European Convention, supra note 99, art. I. The American Convention reads as
follows: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons ... the full and free exercise of those rights and
freedoms .... " American Convention, supra note 100, art. I.
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judicatory and advisory jurisdiction,' °9  is the judicial body
responsible for enforcing the American Convention.'" Its counter-
part in the European Convention is the European Court of Human
Rights."'
The African Charter has been passed by the Organization of
African Unity's Assembly of Heads of State and Government but is
not yet in force." 2 The African Charter, although similar in some
respects to the European and American Conventions, reflects Afri-
can principles and was designed to meet particular African needs." 3
The preamble recognizes the African tradition of responsibility to
the community by providing that "[t]he enjoyment of rights and
freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of every-
one."""' This concept expressing an individual's obligations to the
State is absent in other regional human rights documents.1" Addi-
tionally, the language contained in the preamble implies that when
economic and social programs collide with civil and political rights,
the former will be given preference:"'
[I]t is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the
right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be
dissociated with economic, social and cultural rights in their
conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of
economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoy-
ment of civil and political rights." 7
Another distinction between Western human rights instruments
and the African Charter is the inclusion of "ethnic groups" as a cat-
109. Adjudicatory jurisdiction empowers the Court to decide disputes involving charges
that a State Party had violated the human rights guaranteed by the Convention. Advisory
jurisdiction allows the Court to interpret the Convention as well as other human rights instru-
ments at the request of Organization of American States organs and member states.
Burgenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L. L. 231, 235 (1982).
Burgenthal, one of the first judges for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, explains in
detail the framework of the Court. See id.
110. American Convention, supra note 100, art. 33, para. b.
I ll. European Convention, supra note 99, art. 19, para. 2.
112. As of September 1982, twelve countries have signed the African Charter: the
Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Su-
dan, Tanzania, and Togo. Two others, Mali and Guinea, have deposited their instruments of
ratification with the General Secretariat. Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J INT'L. L. 667, 669-70 (1982). The African Charter
goes into force after its ratification by twenty-six of the fifty member States of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity. African Charter, supra note 101, art. 63, para. 3.
113. Gittleman, supra note 112, at 674.
114. African Charter, supra note 101, preamble, cl. 6.
115. The concept of "duties" generally refers only to a State's obligation to its citizens.
In drafting the African Charter, the socialist States such as Ethiopia and Mozambique could
not reconcile the concept of "individual" rights with the socialist philosophy. To ensure that all
States would ratify the African Charter, its drafters provided that an individual must have
obligations flowing back to the State. Gittleman, supra note 112, at 676-77.
116. Id. at 677.
117. African Charter, supra note 101, preamble, cl. 7.
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egory in the African Charter's nondiscrimination clause." 8 One
commentator has written that this express prohibition against dis-
crimination by ethnic group "constitutes a major step for the conti-
nent as a whole because the realization of this right will lead to
greater economic opportunity for those peoples not of the same kin-
ship as the head of State of government."" 9 This same commentator
emphasizes that while discrimination will not stop overnight, African
leaders may feel pressured into modifying such abuse to escape pub-
lic rebuke from the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights.120
Some rights guaranteed by the African Charter are the right to
life; 12 the right to dignity and legal status, which is bolstered by a
prohibition of "[a]ll forms of exploitation and degradation of man
particularly slave trade, torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading pun-
ishment and treatment; 122 the right to have a cause heard;' the
right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or
tribunal; 12 4 the right to work under satisfactory conditions with
equal pay for equal work; 2 5 the right to the provision of necessary
health care by the State; 26 the right to an education; 2 7 the right to
freely participate in the cultural life of the community; 8 and, the
rights of the family. 29 The Charter also provides for the elimination
of discrimination against women' 30 and 'the care of the aged and dis-
abled.' 3' One scholar finds the right to food to be implicit in Article
22 of this Charter, which provides as follows:
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social
and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and
identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of
mankind.
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to
118. Individuals are entitled to the African Charter's protections "without distinction of
any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political, or any other opin-
ion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status." Id. art 2.
119. Gittleman, supra note 112, at 683. Gittleman states that the nondiscrimination
clause is reflective of a principle in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity calling
for cooperation transcending ethnic and national differences. Id.; see also Charter of the Or-
ganization of African Unity, done May 23, 1963, preamble, cl. 4, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, reprinted
in 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963).
120. Gittleman, supra note 112, at 683.
121. African Charter, supra note 101, art. 4.
122. Id. art. 5.
123. Id. art. 7, para. 1.
124. Id. art. 7, para. I(d).
125. Id. art. 15.
126. Id. art. 16.
127. Id. art. 17, para. 1.
128. Id. art. 17, para. 2.
129. Id. art. 18, paras. I, 2.
130. Id. art. 18, para. 3.
131. Id. art. 18, para. 4.
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ensure the exercise of the right to development.' 32
The legal effect of the African Charter is not as clear as that of
the American or European Conventions. Parties to the African
Charter have an obligation to "recognize the rights, duties and free-
doms enshrined" in it.131 Because there is no express guarantee of
the implementation of rights, the African Charter may be inter-
preted as a set of rights to be promoted, rather than protected."3 4 On
the other hand, the African Charter may be taken as binding by the
clause obligating member States to "undertake to adopt legislation
or other measures to give effect to [the rights, duties and freedoms
enshrined in the African Charter]." '35
3. Customary International Law. - Of the human rights doc-
uments discussed above, Ethiopia is a signatory to only one, the
United Nations Charter.136 This does not mean that Ethiopia or
other nonparties are totally immune from the principles espoused in
the other documents discussed above. Just as customs and traditions
constitute a part of a state's domestic law, customs and traditions
comprise a part of international law. In addition to the many schol-
ars' 37 who believe customary international law exists, Judge Am-
moun, Vice President of the International Court of Justice in the
Namibia case acknowledged and applied customary international
law: "Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding
qua international convention within the meaning of Article 38, para-
graph 1(a) of the Statute of the Court, they can bind States on the
132. Id. art. 22; see also Shepherd, supra note 12, at 529.
133. African Charter, supra note 101, art. I.
134. Gittleman, supra note 112, at 688-89. In a promotional document, states set forth
standards that they pledge themselves to secure progressively. Conversely, in a protective docu-
ment, states are obligated to give effect to the rights. Id. Lippman and Schwelb discuss
whether the Civil and Political Covenant and the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant are
protective or promotional. See Lippman, supra note 85, at 477-78; see also Schwelb, supra
note 97.
135. African Charter, supra note 101, art. I; see also Gittleman, supra note 112, at
688-89. An earlier draft version provided that States "shall guarantee the rights and freedoms
stated in the present Covention [sic] and shall undertake to adopt, in accordance with their
constitutional provisions, legislative and other measures to ensure their respect." African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples' Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. I (1979) (draft pre-
pared by a Meeting of Experts of the Organization of African Unity, Dakar, Senegal, Nov.
23-Dec. 8, 1979). Had this version been adopted, the argument for the African Charter's bind-
ing legal effect would be more persuasive.
136. Ethiopia became a member of the United Nations on November 13, 1945. Roster
of the United Nations, 1960 U.N.Y.B 693.
137. See, e.g., Burgenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissi-
ble Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 77 (L. Henken ed. 1981); M. Mc-
DOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & C. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980)
[hereinafter McDoUGAL]; D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82
COLUM. L. REV. I 110 (1982); Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
I (L. Henkin ed. 1981); Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International
Human Rights Law, 1980 AM. Soc'y INT'L. L. PROC. 20; Sohn, supra note 74; Teson, Interna-
tional Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L. L. 869 (1985).
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basis of custom within the meaning of paragraph l(b) of the same
Article."' 38 The United States Supreme Court has recognized cus-
tomary international law and held that it is "part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of ap-
propriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination. 139
Human Rights are binding as a result of the combined effect of
treaties, United Nations resolutions, and other international and re-
gional documents. 40 One commentator explains this process as
follows:
[T]reaties play a crucial role in the creation of these [human
rights] laws - but not just through the usual method of creat-
ing strictly defined obligations that restrict the ratifying parties.
More importantly, treaties containing generalized principles of
international law generate rules of customary international law
that bind even non-signatories."4
According to this interpretation, when certain state practices become
customary and are further recognized by States as obligatory, a cus-
tom of international law is created, and states are legally bound to
adhere to that norm.1 42
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the single most
important reflection of the customary international law of human
rights.143 Although the Declaration was originally created as a non-
binding document, many of its principles have gained wide accept-
ance,144 thereby establishing them as "binding" principles of custom-
138. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 67, 76. Article 38 I(a) and (b) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice provides as follows:
I. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law, ....
139. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see generally Lillich, supra note 137.
Lillich explores the possibilites and problems of using international human rights law in do-
mestic litigation.
140. See, e.g., McDoUGAL, supra note 137, at 7-27.
141. D'Amato, supra note 137, at 1127.
142. The establishment of a custom is a specific stage in the formation of customary
international law. The decisive element is that states recognize the custom as legally binding.
All states need not follow the custom or practice for it to become part of customary interna-
tional law. G. TUNKi N, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-27 (1974).
143. See, e.g., Burgenthal, supra note 75, at 16; Lillich, supra note 137.
144. A United Nations study on human rights observed as follows:
Evidence of the impact of the Universal Declaration of Human rights may be
found in texts of various national constitutions which were adopted after the
adoption of the Declaration. Several of these constitutions expressly refer, either
in their preambles or in their operative provisions, to the Declaration. In addi-
tion, many other constitutions contain detailed provisions on a number of human
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ary international law. 1 5 This customary or universal standard of
human rights recognizes those fundamental rights that are the most
basic ingredients necessary for life and from which no state may der-
ogate.' 46 In part, fundamental rights include the freedom from tor-
ture,"'47 slavery, 48 and arbitrary deprivation of life;149 the "right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law"; 50 the "right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion";' 5 ' and the right not to
be "held guilty of a criminal offense at the time when it was commit-
ted." 52 In addition to these rights, certain other rights that are uni-
formly accepted as part of the human rights catalogue can be in-
cluded above. These other rights, however, are not considered
fundamental because a state may derogate from such rights.15
4. Lack of Enforcement Does Not Invalidate. - Under inter-
national law, human rights enforcement lacks a centralized, compul-
sive judicial component; however, human rights persist as an impor-
tant ideal for the international legal community. 54  Those
rights, most of which are inspired by, or often modeled on, the text of the arti-
cles of the Declaration.
U.N. Action in the Field of Human Rights, 17 U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2 (1974).
145. McDOUGAL, supra note 137.
146. Derogation clauses allow States to deviate from certain human rights practices in
time of war or national emergency. The Civil and Political Covenant permits derogation in the
following instances:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the exis-
tence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant
may take measures derogating from their obligations :under the present Cove-
nant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under inter-
national law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, col-
our, sex, language, religion or social origin.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 4, para. 1. Paragraph two lists those rights
from which no State may derogate. Id. para. 2.
147. Id. art. 8; European Convention, supra note 99, art. 4; American Convention,
supra note 100, art. 6.
148. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 6; European Convention, supra
note 99, art. 6; American Convention, supra note 100, art. 5.
149. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 7; European Convention, supra
note 99, art. 3; American Convention, supra note 100, art. 5.
150. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 16; European Convention, supra
note 99, art. 2; American Convention, supra note 100, art. 3.
151. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 18; European Convention, supra
note 99, art. 9; American Convention, supra note 100, art. 12.
152. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 85, art. 15; European Convention, supra
note 99, art. 7; American Convention, supra note 100, art. 5.
153. See Teson, supra note 137, at 874. Rights upon which international instruments
agree comprise human rights law regardless of how many or which States are parties to the
instruments.
154. H. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 212 (1961); Schachter, The Views of "Character-
ists" and "'Skeptics" on Human Rights in the World Legal Order: Two Wrongs Don't Make a
Right, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 357 (1981); Shelton, supra note 98; Teson, supra note 137.
Enforcement has always been seen as the weak link in international law, to the
point of providing an argument to some that it does not exist. There are at least
two bases on which disagreement with this negative approach can rest: one is
with the factual premise that enforcement does not - or cannot- occur; the other
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commentators who believe that the lack of enforcement essentially
diminishes the importance of these human rights agreements are
overlooking the general inefficacy of all international enforcement
mechanisms. Therefore, if their argument is accepted, one must deny
the legal character of international law altogether.155 Additionally,
this view clearly ignores the manner in which international law
works:
Unlike domestic societies where legislatures, courts, and govern-
mental agencies create law, law in the international arena re-
sults from the subtle interplay of claims, counterclaims, actions
and missions of many international actors. Thus, what nations
do and say, even if they sometimes do not believe it, becomes
part of the raw material from which international law ultimately
springs. 56
It is admittedly difficult to document the effectiveness of inter-
national human rights treaties and the various principles promul-
gated under such treaties. There are several factors that may be in-
fluencing a nation's human rights policy at any given time. Human
rights may be improved in response to subtle pressures from internal
as well as external groups who hold the potential to publicly investi-
gate or condemn official actions. This may result in positive changes
for the parties involved, but, unfortunately, there is no way to deter-
mine what source actually instigates the changes. 157 Meanwhile, the
lack of effective enforcement procedures permits gross violations of
human rights to go unchecked.
B. Human Rights Cannot be Part of International Law
1. United Nations Charter and Other International Instru-
ments. - Some scholars believe that despite the growing codification
of human rights obligations, 58 legally and realistically, human rights
do not belong in the sphere of international law. 59 Proponents of this
view recognize that the United Nations Charter and the Universal
is opposition to the narrow conceptual approach to law which premises its exis-
tence on the availability of a police force to sanction lawbreakers.
Shelton, supra note 98, at 7.
155. Teson, supra note 137, at 876.
156. Id.
157. No comprehensive study has ever been done on the effects of human rights proce-
dures on the laws and practices of states. Shelton, supra note 98, at 7.
158. Human rights obligations are codified in fifty United Nations treaties, two major
regional instruments, and more than one hundred labor standards treaties of the International
Labour Organization. Id.
159. See. e.g., Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order?.
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269 (1978); Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Develop-
ment of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. REv. 609 (1979) [herein-
after Watson, Legal Theory); Watson, Normativity and Reality in International Human
Rights Law, 13 STETSON L. REV. 221 (1984).
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Declaration of Human Rights speak of "human rights and funda-
mental freedoms"'160 and "the inherent dignity of the equal and ina-
lienable rights of all members of the human family."' 6' Neverthe-
less, it must be emphasized that these documents protecting human
rights were drafted against the background of World War II's devas-
tation.1 62 Consequently, instead of providing effective mechanisms
for enforcement, these documents contain explicit nonintervention
clauses that perpetuate the Westphalian' 63 legal order and belie a
willingness to give legal force and effect to the protection of human
rights. The nonintervention clause of the United Nations Charter af-
firms the importance of the Westphalian concepts of sovereign equal-
ity and domestic jurisdiction, and states that
[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application
and enforcement measures under Chapter VII.'"
The location of the nonintervention clause in Article 2 of the
Charter indicates its superiority over the human rights provisions.
One scholar explains that while human rights are mentioned in Arti-
cle 1, the purposes article, the opening sentence in Article 2 effec-
tively states that its principles have a higher priority than the pur-
poses of Article 1.165 That sentence states as follows: "The
Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles
. ,"I6 From that statement comes the argument that the Charter
imposes guiding principles and not legal obligations on member
states concerning human rights.
2. Cultural Relativism. - Cultural relativism is another con-
cept that rejects the existence of international human rights. As the
160. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
161. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 76, preamble.
162, Lane, supra note 159, at 281.
163. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years War. The
Westphalian world legal order emphasized decentralization, territorial sovereignty, and sover-
eign equality. Under that order, an individual's rights were protected only at the volition of the
individual State. Thus, international recognition and protection of human rights were not fea-
tures of the Westphalian philosophy. Id. at 270-71.
164. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
165. See Watson, The Limited Utility of International Law in the Protection of Human
Rights, 1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. I, 3.
166. U.N. CHARTER art. 2. The Charter imposes guiding principles, not legal obligations
on member states concerning human rights. Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights, 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. 316, 317-18 (1949); see also L. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS
249 (1959); L. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 340n, at 745 (1955) (The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not intended to impose legal obligations).
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name implies, cultural relativists believe that the existence of cus-
toms and traditions unique to each culture necessitates a relative
definition of human rights.167 Cultural relativists believe that no
transboundary legal or moral standards may be judged either as ac-
ceptable or unacceptable against human rights practices. 168 Accord-
ing to the relativist, cultural traditions should be honored, and the
West especially should not impose its ideas of human rights on Third
World societies. 69
3. Lack of Enforcement Invalidates. - Finally, pragmatists
argue against the existence of a universal human rights body of law.
Their basic tenet is that without effective enforcement of interna-
tional human rights, such a concept can be nothing more than an
ideal. 70 These commentators emphasize the wide gap between a
state's verbal assertions concerning human rights and its actual be-
havior. Further, they assert that customary international law cannot
be based on a state's verbal assertions because custom by definition
is a reflection of a state's actual practice.' 17 If customary law were
based on goals rather than practice, there could be no guarantee that
a state would obey the law. Presently, since international organiza-
tions are incapable of enforcing state conformity, a universal human
rights body of law is nonexistent. 72
C. Prevailing View
A consensus can be reached between these two opposing ap-
proaches regarding the existence of universally accepted human
rights. Essentially, certain human rights are so basic that they exist
among all cultures. Some relativists agree that the right to life and
167. E. MCWHINNEY. UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING (1984); Mani, Regional Ap-
proaches to the Implementation of Human Rights, 21 INDIAN J. INT'L. L. 96 (1981); Murphy,
Objections to Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433 (1981); Pollis,
Liberal. Socialist and Third World Perspectives on Human Rights, in TOWARD A HUMAN
RIGHTS FRAMEWORK I (1982); Said & Nasser, The Use and Abuse of Democracy in Islam, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 61 (1980); Wai, Human Rights in
Sub-Sahara Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS; CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (1979);
see also Teson, supra note 137 (concise explanation of cultural relativism).
168. For a description of some unique customs, see Teson, supra note 137, at 870, 870
n.10.
169. See supra note 163. Alternatively, relativists contend that if substantive human
rights norms do in fact exist, their meaning varies substantially from culture to culture. See
Pollis, supra note 167, at 23.
170. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 166, § 13A, at 19-20; Lane, supra note 159, at 282-83;
Murphy, supra note 167; Watson, Legal Theory, supra note 159, at 626; Watson, supra note
165, at 3-5.
171. Watson, supra note 165, at 5. States already behave in compliance with the evolv-
ing norm because it is their behavior that defines the norm. Id.
172. Teson, supra note 137, at 874. The existence of an international human rights re-
gime protecting individuals against state abuse is no longer a precatory concept, but a political
fact. See Burgenthal, supra note 137; McDOUGAL, supra note 137, at 5-6; Henkin, supra note
137, at 15; Sohn, supra note 74.
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the freedom from torture are absolute rights. 17  Moreover, an in-
creasing number of Third World scholars reject the relativist ap-
proach.'74 The Soviet Union has also departed from the relativist ap-
proach. By its signing of the Helsinki Accords, the Soviet Union has
indicated its acceptance of the principles contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.175 Spokesmen for the Eastern bloc
states have suggested that the principle of nonintervention does not
apply in cases in which mass violations of human rights occur. 1 6
Finally, the present unenforceability of human rights is not tanta-
mount to their nonexistence.1 77
III. The Right to Food - An International Human Right?
The right to food is not a new concept to international law. This
right is explicitly addressed in both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights. The African Charter on Human and Peo-
ple's Rights implicity provides for the right to food. 78 Moreover, nu-
merous resolutions promulgated by the United Nations deal with the
problems of food shortages, desertification and agricultural tech-
niques.17' The underlying purpose of these resolutions is to promote
"the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger."1 80
In 1974 the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order was adopted by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations for the purpose of helping the develop-
ing countries mitigate their economic difficulties.'18 The section on
food provides as follows:
All efforts should be made
(a) To take full account of specific problems of de-
173. Teson, supra note 137, at 873.
174. Eisemokhai, Towards Adequate Defense of Human Rights in Africa, 21 INDIAN J.
INT'L. L. 141 (1981). In criticizing the African governments' failure to comply with human
rights law, Eisemokhai states that Africa must revert from the rule of force to the rule of law.
Id. at 152; see also Haile, Human Rights, Stability and Development in Africa: Some Obser-
vations on Concept and Reality, 24 VA. J. INT'L. L. 575 (1984). The adoption of the African
Charter further evidences the rejection of the relativist approach.
175. Supra note 84 and accompanying text.
176. Leary, When Does the Implementation of International Human Rights Constitute
Interference Into the Essentially Domestic Affairs of a State? in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE I, 16 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978). It is generally agreed that the domes-
tic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter does not apply when a state engages in
gross violations of human rights. Burgenthal, supra note 75, at 17.
177. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 242.
178. See supra notes 82, 92, 132 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 181-201 and accompanying text.
180. Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 85, art. II, para. 2.
181. The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic




veloping countries, particularly in times of food
shortages, in the international effort connected with the
food problem; ...
(c) By the international community to undertake
concrete and speedy measures with a view to arresting
desertification, salination and damage by locusts or any
other similar phenomenon involving several developing
countries, particularly in Africa . . .
(f) To insure that developing countries can import
the necessary quantity of food without undue strain on
their foreign exchange resources . . .
(g) To insure that concrete measures to increase
food production and storage facilities in developing
countries are introduced .... 18I
The World Food Conference,"8 3 held in November 1974,
adopted the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and
Malnutrition 184 and various other resolutions'85 dealing with food
problems. The Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger
and Malnutrition recognized that a world food security system that
ensured an adequate availability of food at all times, irrespective of
weather fluctuations and free of political and economic pressures,
should facilitate the development process of developing countries. It
also declared the wide gap separating developed and developing
countries must be eliminated to bring about a long term solution to
the food problem.18 Accordingly, the Declaration proclaimed as
follows:
1. Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to
be free from hunger and malnutrition . .. [T]he eradication of
hunger is a common objective of all the countries of the interna-
tional community, especially of the developed countries and
others in a position to help.
2. It is a fundamental responsibility of Governments to
work together for higher food production and a more equitable
and efficient distribution of food between countries and within
countries...
4. It is a responsibility of each State concerned, in accor-
182. Id. at 5-6. The purpose of the Programme was to ensure application of the Declara-
tion on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, Special Session 6 U.N.
GAOR (2229th plen. mtg) Supp. (No. 1) at I, U.N. Doc A/3201 (1974). The Declaration
called upon the international community to assist the depressed economies of the developing
countries. It states that the Declaration shall be one of the most important bases of economic
relations between all peoples and all nations. Id. at 5.
183. Report of the World Food Conference, E/CONF.65120, U.N. Sales No.
E.75.11.A.3 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 266 (1975).
184. Id. ch. IV.
185. Id. ch. V.
186. Id. ch. IV, para 9.
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dance with its sovereign judgment and internal legislation, to re-
move the obstacles to food production and provide proper incen-
tives to agricultural producers .... 187
The Declaration further directs developed countries to provide
developing countries with sustained technical and financial assistance
on favorable terms. This assistance should be free of conditions in-
consistent with the sovereignty of the receiving States."'8 It calls for
all countries to establish a world food security system, in part, by
earmarking stocks or funds for meeting international emergency
food requirements.189 The Declaration concludes by affirming the in-
tent of the participating States to make full use of the United Na-
tions system in implementing the Declaration and other decisions
adopted by the Conference. These other resolutions concern objec-
tives and strategies of food production, priorities for agricultural and
rural development, fertilizers, policies to improve nutrition, scientific
water management, the balance between population and food supply,
world food security, and the establishment of an International Fund
for Agricultural Development. 90 The twenty-ninth session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations endorsed these resolutions
and, upon the Conference's recommendations, established a World
Food Council. 91
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is another
body of the United Nations working toward solving the world's food
problems. 92 The FAO and the United Nations jointly established
the World Food Programme (WFP) to provide food aid to develop-
ing countries. 193 At pledging conferences, Member States of the
United Nations pledge commodities, cash, and services to the WFP.
The members then apply this aid to emergency feeding operations
for drought relief and other development projects such as school and
hospital feeding, post-primary education, agricultural development,
land and water development, erosion control, and construction of
roads, community facilities, and other infrastructural works."94 At
the 1984 pledging conference, the President of the Conference, Mr.
Anwarul Karim Chowdhury of Bangladesh, hailed the WFP as be-
187. Id. ch. IV.
188. Id. ch. IV, para 7.
189. Id. ch. IV, para. 12.
190. Id. ch. V.
191. 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31-A) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/3348 (1974).
192. See Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
1946 U.N.Y.B. 693. The Constitution of the FAO was adopted by the United Nations Confer-
ence on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia on July 13, 1943 and entered into force
on October 16, 1945. Id.
193. The World Food Programme, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/
1714 (1961).
194. See The World Food Programme, 1974 U.N.Y.B. 426.
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ing one of the largest international assistance organizations and,
more importantly, one of the most important souces of multilateral
assistance. 9 5 The Conference intended to raise 1.35 billion dollars in
voluntary contributions for the regular resources of the Programme
for the 1985-86 biennium and a minimum of 500,000 tons a year for
the International Emergency Food Reserve. 96
In response to the current emergency situation in Africa, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations established the Office for
Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA). 19 7 This Office's main
function is to ensure that all elements of the United Nations system
closely cooperate with the African countries affected, the specialized
agencies of the United Nations, donor governments, and nongovern-
mental organizations in order to provide emergency assistance to the
affected countries in both a timely and effective manner. 9 ' The Con-
ference on the Emergency Situation in Africa convened on March
11, 1985, informing the international community of the situations
surrounding the drought and famine in twenty sub-Saharan African
countries. 99 To convey this information, the OEOA compiled sum-
mary reports on each country, assessed its need for food and deter-
mined any other relief items sought during 1985. The report based
this determination on the total cost of assessed unmet needs against
the aid already pledged.200 Donor governments were asked to con-
firm their previous pledges of assistance and requested to make new
pledges to cover the 1.6 billion dollars of required funds.20'
A. Arguments For and Against the Right to Food
The immense international response to the current famine in
Africa may be attributed to the apparent existence of a right to food.
Indeed, spokesmen for the above-described United Nations' bodies
have referred to the right to be free from hunger.20 2 The Universal
195. 1984 United Nations Pledging Conference on the United Nations/Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations World Food Programme, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.124/
SR/I at 4, 12, March 1984. The World Food Programme channels one third of the total world
food aid. Id.
196. Id. At the close of the conference, $658.3 million or 49% of the target and 475,000
tons of food grains were pledged. As a rule, pledges equal one-half of the target at the end of a
conference, and there are always new pledges. Id. at 11.
197. Conference on the Emergency Situation in Africa, U.N. Doc. SG/Conf.2, 22 Feb-
ruary 1985.
198. Id. at 2.
199. The Conference was convened after a meeting on the Ethiopian situation held in
New York on December 18, 1984. Id. at 12.
200. At the end of January 1985, the reports estimated Ethiopia's total food require-
ments for 1985 to be 1,500,000 tons and the total cost of assessed unmet needs (including non-
food meals) to be $379.3 million. Id. at 59, 60-62.
201. Id. at 5.
202. The President of the Conference urged everyone, in particular the donor countries,
to consider carefully the current situation in the developing countries, particularly those in
Africa, and to pledge contributions so that the targets of the Programme might be met and
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Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explicitly provide for the right
to adequate food while the African Charter, the Declaration on the
Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, and the other United Na-
tions resolutions addressing food problems implicitly acknowledge
the right to be free from hunger.20 3 One commentator asserts that
the right to food is a primary right in the Third World.20 4 If a person
is not provided sufficient food to live, his extensive list of civil, politi-
cal, economic, social, and cultural human rights is rendered
meaningless.
The reality, irrespective of good intentions, is that it is some-
times very difficult, if not impossible, for a nation to adequately feed
all of its people. The causes of this inability are manifold. In Africa
alone, the lack of rainfall, the population explosion, pressures from
the super powers, and the self-serving policies of ruling elites have all
culminated in the present emergency.20 5 While the African Charter
implies a right to food, it is not yet in force, and the entire African
Charter may be interpreted as having no binding legal effect.2 06
Given these limitations, commentators have argued that developing
states cannot be expected to guarantee economic rights such as the
right to adequate food.20 7 The documents menti6ned above do not
expressly articulate that the right to food imposes affirmative obliga-
tions upon the Party States to guarantee this right. Even if docu-
ments did impose affirmative obligations, nonsignatories would not
be bound unless the right to food had become part of customary in-
ternational law. As discussed earlier, the Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Covenant directs each party to take steps to realize the rights
in the Covenant "to the maximum of its available resources. ' 20 8 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was created as a nonbinding
document, and although parts of it are now binding through custom-
ary international law, the right to adequate food has not been in-
cluded in its list of universal human rights.20 9
Conversely, certain civil and political rights can and should be
additional efforts exerted to make it possible for the millions of hungry and malnurished to
receive food, as was their right. See supra note 195, at 5; see generally supra note 197.
203. See supra notes 82, 92, 132, 182, 183-194 and accompanying text.
204. Ajami, Human Rights and World Order, in R. FALK & S. KIM, SOCIAL JUSTICE
AND WORLD ORDER (1981).
205. See generally Haile, supra note 174; Shepherd, supra note 12.
206. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
207. Teson, supra note 137, at 687.
208. Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 85, art. 2, para. 1; see also
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text. Although developing nations may
not be obligated to guarantee economic rights, they place great importance on achieving them.
See Teson, supra note 137, at 677; Watson, supra note 165, at 4 (If the population is starving
and the economy is in ruin, the state would do a disservice to its citizens by trying to imple-
ment the human rights scheme of developed nations).
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guaranteed in treaties and as part of customary international law
because they do not involve financial outlay, commitment of re-
sources, or other positive action on the part of governments. 1 0 The
right to be free from torture, for example, merely requires that the
government refrain from committing torturous acts upon its citizens.
Hence, both the perceived importance of the right and the govern-
ment's ability " to honor the right without hardship characterize the
rights that commonly are regarded as binding upon all states.212
B. Ethiopians' Right to Food
At first glance, there appears to be no obligation imposed upon
the Ethiopian government to feed its people. Ethiopia has signed no
treaty specifically requiring it to provide its people with adequate
food. The United Nations Charter, of which Ethiopia is a party, 13
stresses the importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms
but does not define either of these terms. Ethiopia would be legally
bound to adequately feed its people if the right to food were consid-
ered a customary or universal human right. As the above discussion
reveals, this is not the case.214 Although the FAO, WFP, OEOA,21 5
and other United Nations' bodies work diligently to feed the starving
people of Ethiopia, it is not because these people have a universal
right to be free from hunger. The aid organizations were established
for humanitarian and possibly political purposes, but not for the ful-
fillment of any legal obligation to feed the world.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part I, under the circumstances
existing in Ethiopia, there is a compelling argument that the Ethio-
pian people have a right to be fed. The Ethiopian government is not
being asked to use nonexistent resources to feed its people. A nation
cannot be compelled to guarantee something that it is unable to de-
liver. Tons of food, however, are being delivered daily. The food sits
on the docks and stockpiles in the capital while the regions that do
not share the Dergue's political views go hungry. 216 The peoples
from Eritrea, Tigre, and Wollo may not have a right to food, but
they do have a right to life and a right to be free from torture.
For the Ethiopian people, the right to life and the right to be
free from torture are not derived from a charter or covenant, but
210. Haile, supra note 174, at 602.
211. This argument differs from Watson's. Irrespective of a government's ability, he
says that if the government cannot be forced to honor a human right, it is not an international
human right. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
212. For a list of these rights, see supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
213. See supra note 136.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 209-212.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 192-193, 197.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 39.
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from customary international law.21 7 Both of these rights do not re-
quire any observance or positive action on the part of the Ethiopian
government. This action comes from the foreign aid workers. These
workers aid the Ethiopians by distributing both food and supplies.
Moreover, their efficient administration of this program facilitates
increased coordination of such programs. Instead of allowing these
aid workers to perform their missions with no obstructions, the Ethi-
opian government has tried to limit the number of aid workers and
has prevented charitable groups from delivering food to rebel areas.
Ethiopia has also embarked on a major resettlement program in
which it subjects peasants from rebel areas to inhumane conditions,
including starvation. 1 8 Many resettlers would have lived but for the
action of their government. By preventing their access to available
food, the government has discriminatorily taken their right to life.
21 9
The resettlement program, as it is presently being conducted, vio-
lates both the Ethiopian peoples' right to be free from torture and
their right to life. Forcing people to endure unsanitary and cramped
conditions for several weeks with little water or no food is as tortur-
ous as any beating, especially considering that 100,000 persons al-
ready have died during "resettlement. 2
IV. Possible Solutions
The actions taken by the Ethiopian government could be ex-
amined under specific guidelines if the African Charter were ratified.
The African Commission of Human Rights as provided for in the
African Charter could consider complaints against Ethiopia brought
by another state or by individuals. 22 One commentator has sug-
gested that an African Court of Human Rights be created; this court
would have jurisdiction over all cases referred by the Commission.222
If such a court were created, perhaps the Ethiopian government
would alter its practices so the Commission would not need to under-
take public investigations.2 23
217. See supra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 44-60.
219. This would not be the case if the government did not have the food at its disposal.
No international instrument obligates a state to feed its people when food is unavailable. See
supra text accompanying notes 207-209.
220. See supra note 48.
221. African Charter, supra note 101, arts. 49, 55. Traditionally, interstate complaint
procedures have rarely been used. States treat the procedures very seriously because of fears
that states will misuse the system to pursue political goals. Furthermore, states do not want to
disrupt otherwise friendly relations with other states, and a state may fear a closer look at its
own human rights record. Shelton, supra note 98, at II.
222. Eisemokhar, supra note 174, at 147. Gittleman suggests the creation of a tempo-
rary African Commission to promote the principles in the African Charter until the commenc-
ment of the Commission provided for in the African Charter. Gittleman, supra note 112, at
717.
223. Gittleman, supra note 112, at 683. The Ethiopian government's concern about its
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Unfortunately, the African Charter is not yet in force. Only
fourteen of the requisite twenty-six states have signed it. 2 " The slow
ratification process that characterizes other human rights instru-
ments makes it very unlikely that the African Charter will take ef-
fect in time to address the present emergency.22 5 Furthermore, there
is no guarantee Ethiopia would be a signatory. Ethiopian representa-
tives participated in drafting the African Charter; however, their in-
put may be indicative of their overall willingness to sign a human
rights agreement. 2 '6 Even if Ethiopia signs, the numerous clawback
causes may prevent a meaningful implementation of the African
Charter. Clawback clauses allow states to restrict rights to the ex-
tent permitted by domestic law or in the case of national emer-
gency. 2 ' Thus, even if the African Commission were to investigate
the Ethiopian situation, it could then conclude that the government's
actions are legally within the boundaries of Ethiopian law.
The United Nations has several mechanisms to address the
Ethiopian government's actions. First, there is the self-reporting pro-
cedure that requires states to submit reports every three years re-
garding civil and political rights; economic, social, and cultural
rights; and freedom of information.22 8 Nongovernmental organiza-
tions, acting as consultants, are also invited to submit their com-
ments and observations on human rights situations.229 These com-
ments along with the state reports are forwarded to the United
Nations Human Rights Commission, the Commission on the Status
of Women, and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities. 230 There is little reason to expect
that reports submitted by Ethiopian governmental officials will high-
light their discriminatory and torturous practices connected with the
distribution of emergency aid.
Second, victims of a government's practices, their friends and
image is evidenced by its more recent attempts to keep its activities secret. See Starving
Wollo, supra note 39, at 10, col. 2.
224. See supra note 112.
225. It took 10 years for 35 out of the 135 member States of the United Nations to
ratify the Civil and Political Covenant, thereby bringing it into force. Nine years after its
original signature, the American Convention entered into force. Gittleman, supra note 112, at
670 n.13.
226. Ethiopia and Mozambique were instrumental in including provisions that list an
individual's obligation to the State and in excluding a prohibition of involuntary servitude. See
supra note 118; see also Gittleman, supra note 112, at 685 n.97.
227. Derogation clauses protect an individual's right more than clawback clauses, Under
derogation clauses, a State may deviate from human rights standards only in limited circum-
stances such as war or other public emergencies. Furthermore, derogation clauses specify
rights that are always nonderogable. Clawback clauses allow a State, in normal circumstances,
to restrict rights according to local law. Gittleman, supra note 112, at 691-92.
228. ECOSOC Res. 1074C (XXXIX) of 28 July 1965; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 64
(providing for the presentation of state reports).
229. Id.
230. Shelton, supra note 98, at 8.
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their attorneys can petition the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mission and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities."3' These bodies examine information
from individuals alleging violations of internationally recognized
human rights. This system's effectiveness is limited by the fact that
governmental officials, rather than independent experts, consider the
allegations.232 Consequently, decisionmaking by the Human Rights
Commission is hampered by political considerations.233 Politics have
already entered the Ethiopian situation.
234
Third, the Human Rights Commission can establish an investi-
gating committee or appoint a special rapporteur to evaluate human
rights violations in a particular country. 23 5 The United States gov-
ernment and the United States delegation to the annual meeting of
the Human Rights Commission had plans to introduce resolutions
calling for an ad hoc investigation in Ethiopia. 236 Even if an investi-
gation were launched, the Ethiopian government would have to coop-
erate fully to make the investigation effective. In the past, countries
have refused to permit investigating groups to conduct on-site in-
spections.23 7 After being pressured for several years, the country may
eventually cooperate or even change its policies, but, at this time,
Ethiopia does not appear ready to do either.238
Last, donor countries and organizations could attach political
strings to their contributions.2 39 The Reagan Administration has uti-
lized U.S. aid as an opportunity to articulate foreign policy argu-
ments. 40 It has urged Ethiopia to increase its own efforts to control
famine, to reduce the pace of resettlement, and to evacuate the relief
camps more humanely. 241 Attaching strict conditions to the aid for
Ethiopia is of limited efficacy, however, since the Ethiopian govern-
ment could simply choose not to receive the aid. In that case, the
Ethiopian people, not the government, would be harmed.
231. ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII) of 1967; ECOSOC Res. 1503 (XLIII) of 1970.
232. Shelton, supra note 98, at 14.
233. Other than the United Nations procedures, all systems allow independent experts
rather than government officials to consider the communications. While the independent Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has reported on
some 20 cases, the governmental Human Rights Commission has taken action on only two. Id.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
235. Shelton, supra note 98, at 15.
236. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
237. Shelton, supra note 98, at 15.
238. After three years of refusing to allow an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile, estab-
lished by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, to enter Chile, the Chilean govern-
ment allowed a visit in 1978. Prior to the first on-site investigation, the government declared
an amnesty involving the release from prison of a large number of individuals. Id.
239. See supra note 70.





Whether by virtue of the United Nations Charter or customary
international law, the Ethiopian people have a human right to life
and a human right to be free from torture. By depriving select ethnic
groups of donated food and relief supplies, the Ethiopian government
is violating the most fundamantal human right of all - the right to
life. Likewise, the inhumane manner in which the resettlement pro-
gram is being conducted violates the right to be free from torture.
Enforcement mechanisms exist, but they are unlikely to redress these
violations. 242 Further, each day that these mechanisms are not en-
forced, literally thousands die from starvation. Perhaps the only real-
istic way to help the Ethiopian people is through the power of politi-
cal and economic pressures from governments worldwide.
International law often works best through its informal channels.
Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu may not care about universal human
rights, but a world outcry against his practices may make him think
twice. After all, the international collaboration of peoples and gov-
ernments has already saved the lives of thousands of Ethiopians.
Janice J. Bole
242. Teson, supra note 137, at 885 n.82. It should be noted that international human
rights procedures are no more than 30 years old, with most procedures less than 10 years old.
Like the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, their effectiveness at im-
plementation may have no bearing on their effectiveness in another 30 years. Shelton, supra
note 98, at 7.
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